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Defendants' vessel was brought into a shipyard for an annual overhaul.
Among other repairs, the ship's generators were to be sprayed with carbon
tetrachloride. This latter work was subcontracted to decedent's employer,
a company specially equipped to handle electrical work. On a day when
the crew was not aboard, the decedent and his foreman engaged in cleaning
these generators. As a result of the improper functioning of the ship's
ventilating system the decedent died from carbon tetrachloride poisoning.
The decedent's administratrix recovered damages in a federal district court
under instructions to the jury whereby either unseaworthiness-of the vessel
or negligence of the shipowner would render the defendants liable. After
affirmance by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court of the United States
vacated the judgment and remanded the cause. Held, the doctrine of
unseaworthiness was inapplicable because the decedent in no way per-
formed "the type of work" traditionally done by a member of the ship's
crew.1 United N.Y. 6 N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n Y. Halecki, 79 Sup. Ct.
517 (1959).
As American maritime law developed in the federal court system, justice
seemed to require that the shipowner should have an absolute, unqualified
and non-delegable duty to furnish to certain persons a seaworthy ship.2 The
early architects of this doctrine applied it to the ship's crew8 and eventually
permitted seamen to recover damages for personal injuries proximately
caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel.4 In 1946, the Supreme Court
in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki5 extended the doctrine of unseaworthiness
to cover stevedores, because the latter performed "seamen's work." Since
1. The case, perdicated on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction; arose under the
New Jersey Wrongful Death Act. N.J. STAT. 2A:31-1 (1952). The Supreme Court
briefly discussed the applicability of state law in maritime cases and the issue of the
defendents' negligence. These questions are not considered in this asenote.
2. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See GLMORE & BrAcd,
AnMIRALTY §§6-38-6-44 (1957).
3. "(Maw and reason will imply sundry engagements of the captain to the
mariners. . . First, that at the commencement of a voyage, the ship shall be furnished
with all the necessary and customary requisites for navigation, or, as the terms is, shall
be found seaworthy; .... " Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed.Cas. 755, 757 (No. 3930)
(D.C.D.Pa. 1789).
4. "[TIhe vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable
to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship. . . ." The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (dictum).
5. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See also Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396
(1954).
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this Supreme Court ruling, the federal judiciary has consistently applied
the extension of coverage to persons engaged in the loading or unloading
of a ship.6 However, the federal courts have been in irreconcilable conflict
as to the feasibility of expanding the Sieracki doctrine to other shore-based
workers.'
The courts which have given a narrow construction to the range of
coverage under the doctrine of unseawortiiness have emphasized that only
those persons performing the traditional tasks of the ship's crew would fall
within the protection of the doctrine.8 These tribunals have refused to
extend the doctrine to repairmen,0 tank and boiler cleaners,' 0 marine
painters," shipyard riggers, 12 firemen 13 or bread salesmen. 1" The courts of
the Second Circuit have been especially adamant and vociferous in their
refusal to expand Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.15 In Guerrini v. United
6. For a listing of the relevant cases see Annot., 98 L. Ed. 160, 164-65 (1953).
7. See Annot., 98 L. Ed., 160, 165-68 (1953); 80 C.J.S. Shipping §85e
(1953, Supp. 1958); 2 NORRIS, SEAMEN §622 n.14 (Supp. 1958).
8. McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 257 F.2d 538 (2d Cit. 1958); West v. United
States, 256 F.2d 671 (3d Cit. 1958); Raidy v. United States, 252 F.2d 117 (4th Cit.
1958); Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F.2d 717 (2d Cit. 1958); Berryhill
v. Pacific Far E. Line, 238 F.2d 385 (9th Cit. 1956); Rich v. United States, 192
F.2d 858 (2d Cit. 1951).
9. West v. United States, 256 F.2d 671 (3d Cit. 1958); Union Carbide Corp.
v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449 (4th Cit. 1958); Raidy v. United States, 252 F.2d 117 (4th
Cir. 1958); Berryhill v. Pacific Far E. Line, 238 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1956); Martini v.
United States, 192 F.2d 649 (2d Cit. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952);
Muratore v. United States, 100 F.Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Peterson v. United
States, 80 F.Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Armento v. United States, 74 F.Supp. 198
(E.D.N.Y. 1947).
10. Rich v. United States, 192 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1951); Cuerrini v. United States,
167 F.2d 352 (2d Cit. 1948), cert. denied, 335 US. 843 (1948); Manera v. United
States, 124 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Lopez v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 870
(E.DN.Y. 1952).
11. Santiago v. United States, 102 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Lundberg v.
Prudential S.S. Corp., 102 F.Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
12. Filipek v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 258 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1958);
Berge v. National Bulk Carriers Corp., 251 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1958); Mikkelsen v. The
Granville, 192 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1951); O'Connell v. Naess, 176 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1949); Lyon v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Laffoon v. United
States, 101 F.Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Fine v. United States, 66 F.Supp. 768
(E.D.N.Y. 1946)..
13. McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 257 F.2d 538 (2d Cit. 1958).
14. Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1955).
15. Filipek v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 258 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1958);
McDaniel v. The M/S Lisholt, 257 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1958); Berge v. National Bulk
Carriers Corp., 251 F.2d 717 (2d Cit. 1958) Rich v. United States, 192 F.2d 858
(2d Cit. 1951); Mikkelsen v. The Cranville, 142 F.2d 809 (2d Cit. 1951); Martini v.
United States, 192 F.2d 649 (2d Cit. 1951), cart. denied, 343 U.S. 926 (1952);
O'Connell v. Naess, 176 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1949); Guerrini v. United States, 167
F.2d 352 (2d Cit. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948); Lyon v. United States,
163 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Manera v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.
N.Y. 1954); Lopez v. United States, 102 F.Sopp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Santiago v.
United States, 102 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Lundberg v. Prudential S.S. Corp.,
102 F.Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Laffoon v. United States, 101 F.Supp. 823 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951); Muratore v. United States, 100 F.Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Peterson
v. United States, 80 F,Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Armento v. United States, 74 F.Supp.
198 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); Fine v. United States, 66 F.Snpp. 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); But
see Lester v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cit. 1956); Torres v. The Kastor, 227
F.2d 664 (2d Cit. 1955).
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States"8 Judge Learned Hand, critical of the wisdom of Sieracki, limited the
Sieracki doctrine to stevedores and longshoremen until the Supreme Court
sanctioned an innovation to the contrary. T The Third and Fourth Circuits,
although less vigorous in restricting the scope of the unseaworthiness doc-
trine, have recently supplemented the "type of work" criterion with the
"navigability of the vessel" test.' 8 Consequently, workers on a ship lying
in dry dock for structural changes were excluded from the protection of
the unseaworthiness doctrine.10
Several courts, desiring to expand coverage under the unseaworthiness
doctrine, have found great comfort in the 1953 Supreme Court decision of
Pope 6 Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn2" which appeared to be indicative of a
liberalizing trend on the part of the high tribunal. In the Hawn case, a
carpenter employed by an independent contractor was injured when he fell
through an uncovered hatch hole on a ship while he was repairing grain-
loading equipment. After refusing a request to overrule Sieracki, the Court
held that Hawn was entitled to damages under the unseaworthiness doctrine.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, reasoned:
Sieracki's legal protection was not based on the name "stevedore"
but on the type of work he did and its relationship to the ship and
to the historic doctrine of seaworthiness. . . . Hawn was put to
work on [the ship] so that the loading could go on at once ...
His need for protection from unseaworthiness was neither more
nor less than that of the stevedores then working with him on the
ship or of seamen who had been or were about to go on a voyage.
16. 167 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948).
17. Id. at 354. See also Hand, J., concurring in Lynch v. United States, 163 F.2d
97, 99 (2d Cir. 1947). Other authorities on admiralty have also been gravely concerned
over the possibilities of coverage inherent in Sieracki. "The inclusion of harbor workers
in addition to stevedores under the seaworthiness doctrine is a logical extension of an
illogical rule first enunciated in the Sieracki decision ... The basis for the giving of
the extraordinary remedy of seaworthiness was twofold; (a) the realization out of a
spirit of humanity that sailors under contract with the shipowner, about to embark on
a voyage where the tempestuous forces of nature were likely to be encountered, were
entitled to be provided with a vessel reasonably sound in hull and in gear, and (b) the
inability of the indentured seaman to leave the vessel at will when a dangerous condition
arose. Neither of these very real considerations face the harbor worker." 2 NORRIS, SEAMEN
§622 (Supp. 1958). "It is submitted that in major part the legal difficulties presently
attending the many faceted litigation which characteristically follows a harbor worker's
shipboard injury are attributable to . . . (2) the extension of the doctrine of "insured
seaworthiness" to harbor workers on a mistaken factual assumption that until recent
days mariners performed harbor workers' services .... " Tetreault, Seamen, Sea-
worthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Vorkers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381, 424 (1954).
18. West v. United States, 256 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1958); Union Carbide Corp.
v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1958); Raidy v. United States, 252 F.2d 117 (4th
Cir. 1958).
19. Raidy v. United States, 252 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1958).
20. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
1959]
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All were subjected to the same danger. All were entitled to like
treatment under law.
2t
it seems to me that the extension of this implied warranty to a repair
crew which works for an independent contractor is unjustified. The Court
can cite no authority for such a holding, and I think there is no logic
in it. Id. at 423.
Professors Gilmore and Black in their textbook on admiralty have inter-
preted Justice Black's language as placing within the Sieracki doctrine "all
workers who are exposed to shipboard hazards as a consequence of their
employment. ' 22 As a result of the Hawn ruling or a broad interpretation
of Sieracki or both, the unseaworthiness doctrine has been extended to
cover carpenters,23 tank and boiler cleaners,24 ship ceilers, 25 night watch-
men,26 members of the dock crew, 2 7 employees of the shipper,28 seamen
on an adjoining fuel barge29 and members of the United States Army.80
The two opposing views collided in the consideration of United'N.Y. 6
N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki and resulted in a 5-4 decision.Y1
Mr. Justice Stewart,S2 in writing the majority opinion, adopted the language
of the dissenting judge in the court of appeals to the effect that the
decedent "was not doing what any crew member had ever done on this
ship or anywhere else in the world so far as we are informed."a3 To
substantiate this conclusion Justice Stewart noted two factors. First, the
work could only be performed when the ship was "dead" with its generators
21. Id. at 412-13. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Black uses the "type
of work" test to reach a conclusion antithetical to the courts of the Second Circuit.
Compare Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent:
There may be some logic in saying that when a longshoreman or
- stevedore is brought aboard ship, the ship should be fit for sailing,- But
22. GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 364 (1957).
23. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Mee v. Kea S.S. Corp.
260 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958); Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953);
Landgraf v. United States, 75 F.Supp. 58 (E.D.Pa. 1947); Sulovitz v. United States, 64
F.Supp. 637 (E.D.Pa. 1945).
24. Torres v. The Kastor, 227 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1955); Crawford v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); Christiansen v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 934
(D.Mass. 1951) (dictum), aff'd, 192 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1951).
25. Eagle Indemn. Co. ex rel. Beall v. United States Lines Co., 86 F.Supp. 949
(D.Md. 1949).
26. Ross v S.S. Zeeland, 240 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1957).
27. Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956) (dictum), Cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
28. Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F.Supp. 234 (E.D.Mo. 1951),
a aal dismissed, 191 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1951).
29. Capadona v. The Lake Atlin, 101 F.Supp. 851 (S.D.Cal. 1951).
30. Caudill v. Victory Carriers, 149 F.Supp. 11 (E.D.Va. 1957).
31. The majority included Justices Stewart, Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whit-
taker. The minority consisted of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also wrote a brief concurring opinion
on the construction of state law. See The M/V "Tungus" v. Skovgaard, 79 Sup. Ct.523 (1959).32. When Mr. Justice Stewart was sitting on the bench of the court of appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, he apparently desired that Sieracki should be limited to its facts;
Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711, 713 (6th Cir. 1955).




dismantled and its crew completely off duty. Second, spraying the genera-
tors "was the work of a specialist, requiring special skill and special
equipment. -4 The contention that many modern ships carry electricians in
their crews was dismissed as immaterial.
The dissenting justices relied heavily upon the Sieracki and Hawn
cases. Advocating a wide application of the "humanitarian policy" of sea-
worthiness, the minority decried the fact that "today's shipowner escapes
his absolute duty because his vessel is modern and outfitted with com-
plicated and dangerous equipment, and because a pattern of contracting
out a sort of work on it has become established.""5 The majority's standards
of the readiness of the ship for immediate voyage and of the degree of
specialization required to perform the work were criticized for leaving
"confusion . . . to breed further litigation in an already heavily litigated
area of the law." 38 The minority would affirm the court of appeal's opinion,
which was written by Judge Learned Hand.37
An evaluation of the Halecki case is most difficult. The majority argu-
ments are convincing and in theory appear to coincide with the traditional
concepts of unseaworthiness. Nevertheless, one can not help but agree
with the minority that chaos has been added to confusion. This web of
diversity is best illustrated by the predicament in which Judge Learned
Hand must find himself. As previously indicated, he had refused to extend
the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine beyond stevedores and long-
shoremen until the Supreme Court would give him a clear mandate to
act otherwise. 8 This mandate came in Pope 6 Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, so
that judge Hand in deciding the Halecki case on the intermediate level
declared "it is now clear that we were wrong . . . in limiting the warranty
[of unseaworthiness] to those doing longshoremen's duties."39 For this
acquiescence in the desires of the Supreme Court, he was reversed. Un-
fortunately Judge Hand does not even have the consolation of having his
original position vindicated, since the lower federal courts must now
contend with both Hawn and Halecki.
The dissent, although not as cogent as the majority, undoubtedly
followed the trend that was developing in the earlier decisions of Sieracki
34. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 79 Sup.Ct. 517,
521 (1959).
35. Id. at 522.
36. Id. at 523.
37. Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (2d
Cir. 1958).
38. Guerrini v. United States, 167 F.2d 352, 354 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 843 (1948).
39. Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708, 711
(2d Cir. 1958). In noting this case while it was still on the level of the court of
appeals, a writer commented: "The issue in this area is no longer the extension of the
protection of the unseaworthiness doctrine to shore-based workers." 58 CoLuz. L. REv.
736, 742 (1958). At the time this appeared to be a proper interpretation of the status
of shore-based workers.
1959]
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and Hawn. Indeed, Justice Stewart's discussion of the latter case is most
inadequate. Ironically, in another case decided the same day as Halecki,
Justice Stewart, again writing for the majority, held on a subsidiary point
that an employee of an independent contractor, engaged in repairing an
oil pump to facilitate the unloading of a cargo of oil, came within the scope
of the unseaworthiness doctrine. 40 The Justice believed that Hawn was
controlling. Although Justice Stewart has apparently been able to solve
the labyrinth of unseaworthiness, he has left the attorney with an ample





In conducting a proceeding to determine the present sanity of con-
demned petitioners, the prison warden refused to hear any testimony on
their behalf. The petitioners' mandamus petitions contended that his
refusal violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Held,
the California statute' permitting execution of allegedly insane murderer on
basis of the warden's unreviewable ex parte determination that prisoner is
sane does not offend due process. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549
(1958).
The justifications for the common law rule against executing an
insane man, vary considerably.2 This concept has been adopted in almost
every jurisdiction having capital punishment,3 either through legislative
40. The M/V "Tungus" v. Skovgaard, 79 Sup.Ct. 503, 508, n.9 (1959).
1. CAL. PEN CODE §§ 3700, 3701 (Supp. 1949), "[1if after his delivery to the
warden for execution, there is good reason to believe that a defendant tinder judgment
of death has become insane, the warden must call such fact to the attention of the
district attorney . . . whose duty it is immediately to file in superior court a petition,
stating . . . that the defendant is believed to be insane . . . thereupon the court must
at once cause to be summoned and impanneled . . . a jury of twelve persons to hear
such inquiry."
'2. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 (Blackstone considered the purpose of the
rile was to prevent the infliction of punishment upon a person so lacking in mental
capacity as to be unable to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment);
3 CoxF, INSTITOTES 6 (Lord Coke declared that it was not an example to others to
execute an insane man, in addition it would be extremely inhumane and cruel); HALE,
PLEAS OF TuE CROWN § 34 (Stokes and ligersol ed. 1847) (Lord lale reasoned that
if lie were of sound memory he might allege something to stay execution); II HOWELL,
ENCLISH STATE TRIALS 474, 477 (1685) (Sir John flawles reasoned that an inability
to prepare for an afterlife was the basis for the rule.)
3. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 26 (1950) (appendix to dissenting opinion);
WEIFrOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DE':FENSF § 5, 463-470 (1954).
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